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Abstract
After the dust cleared in the early 1990s, the institutional framework for realizing the peaceful
unification of Europe was laid down at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993. The
statement by the EU at Copenhagen that it was ready to accept new members that fulfill certain
criteria led to applications from ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As laid down in the
Treaties, it fell to the Commission to provide advice on these applications to the Member States
of the EU, which it did in July of 1997 in its ambitious program of reform, known as Agenda
2000. Agenda 2000 sought to look at the prospect of enlargement not as a simple addition to the
existing EU, but as a process that would have an impact on the way in which it should be governed
and funded at what was already a time of massive change. Agenda 2000 also took a close look
at the future of the main EU policies, particularly those of agriculture and regional policy, which
were already in a process of reform, and which would be strongly affected by the arrival of new
members. Agenda 2000 was accompanied by a set of Opinions from the European Commission
on the applications for membership that had been received by ten countries of Central and Eastern
Europe that enjoyed association agreements with the EU. The Opinions were able to conclude that
a number of the candidates were already in a position to begin negotiating their membership in the
EU. However, the Commission was conscious of the need to avoid the appearance of new divisions
in Europe, this time between those candidates whose recent progress in economic and political
reform had brought them to the negotiating table, and those who had started from more difficult
positions, such as Romania and Bulgaria, or who had, like Slovakia, not yet convinced the EU
of their commitment to functioning democratic practices. The Commission therefore proposed an
inclusive system, whereby we would revisit the progress made with the Copenhagen criteria every
year, both for those who were not yet negotiating, and for those who were. The combination of
strict application of the objective criteria and readiness to welcome progress along the way will
result in a well-prepared enlargement of the EU. Now, in autumn 2002, the end of the road is in
sight, at least for the best-prepared candidates. This essay outlines how the negotiations that began
in 1998 have brought us to this point. They have been a test for all concerned, but a test that
demonstrates clearly the ability of the EU to act in an area of decisive interest.
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The heady days of autumn 1989 signalled that the peaceful
unification of Europe that was foreseen by the fathers of the pre-
sent-day European Union ("EU" or "Union") was not a dream: if
we were able to muster sufficient determination, it was a real
possibility.
After the dust cleared in the early 1990s, the institutional
framework for realizing that possibility was laid down at the Co-
penhagen European Council in June 1993.1 The criteria agreed
on in Copenhagen set down in concrete terms the common val-
ues that a Candidate Country must respect in order to become a
member of the EU. These values concern democracy, rule of
law, economic stability, and the ability to take on the EU legisla-
tion.2 By one of those quirks of history, it is in Copenhagen, at
the end of this year, that we hope to put the first seal on the
process after nine years of hard work.
The statement by the EU at Copenhagen that it was ready to
accept new members that fulfill these criteria led to applications
from ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe.3 As laid
down in the Treaties, it fell to the Commission to provide advice
on these applications to the Member States of the EU, which it
did in July of 1997 in its ambitious program of reform, known as
Agenda 2000.'
* Director-General, DG Enlargement, European Commission.
1. See Copenhagen European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.C. BULL., no.6, at
7 (1993), available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/ec/copen.htm.
2. Id. at 13.
3. See European Commission, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Europe, E.U.
BULL., no. 7/8, at 7 (1997), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/in-
tro/ag2000-opinions.htm [hereinafter For a Stronger and Wider Europe]. The statements
made at Copenhagen led to the eventual applications from Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
4. Id.
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Agenda 2000 sought to look at the prospect of enlargement
not as a simple addition to the existing EU, but as a process that
would have an impact on the way in which it should be governed
and funded at what was already a time of massive change. The
plan for Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU") was on
course, as was the development of a common foreign and secur-
ity policy ("CFSP"), although it was still somewhat running be-
hind events, as the tragic recent history of Yugoslavia shows.5
Agenda 2000 also took a close look at the future of the main EU
policies, particularly those of agriculture and regional policy,
which were already in a process of reform, and which would be
strongly affected by the arrival of new members.
Agenda 2000 was accompanied by a set of Opinions6 from
the European Commission on the applications for membership
that had been received by ten countries of Central and Eastern
Europe that enjoyed association agreements with the EU.7
These agreements had already begun to bear fruit, as the accel-
erated opening of the European Community ("EC") market led
to rapid economic growth in the Candidate Countries. The
Opinions were therefore able to conclude that a number of the
candidates were already in a position to begin negotiating their
membership in the EU.8
However, the Commission was conscious of the need to
avoid the appearance of new divisions in Europe, this time be-
tween those candidates whose recent progress in economic and
political reform had brought them to the negotiating table, and
those who had started from more difficult positions, such as
Romania and Bulgaria, or who had, like Slovakia, not yet con-
vinced the EU of their commitment to functioning democratic
practices.9
The Commission therefore proposed an inclusive system,
5. See, e.g., RogerJ. Goebel, Legal Framework: European Economic and European Union:
Will the EMU Ever Fly?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219 (1998).
6. See European Commission, Agenda 2000 and the European Commission's Opinions,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/ag200_opinions.htm#
Opinions.
7. See For a Stronger and Wider Europe, supra n.3, at 91-96.
8. See id. These opinions concluded that negotiations for accession should be
opened with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.
9. See id. Latvia and Lithuania were the other two countries whose applications
were to be revisited "as soon as [they] had made sufficient progress in satisfying the
conditions of membership defined by the European Council in Copenhagen." Id.
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whereby we would revisit, the progress made with the Copenha-
gen criteria every year, both for those who were not yet negotiat-
ing, and for those who were.' ° On the basis of its annual exami-
nation in its now famous "Regular Reports," the Commission
would recommend to the Member States whether or not to be-
gin negotiations with one candidate or another.1" The combina-
tion of strict application of the objective criteria and readiness to
welcome progress along the way will result in a well-prepared en-
largement of the EU. The Candidate Countries are more closely
involved in some areas of day-to-day business than any previous
candidates for membership. Their Heads of State or govern-
ment regularly attend EU Summits; their representatives are sit-
ting alongside those of the current Member States in the Con-
vention on the Future of Europe, the constitutional assembly
that will prepare the next round of constitutional revision in
2004; and they manage EU funds in a more decentralized way
than other partners of the EU.12
Now, in autumn 2002, the end of the road is in sight, at least
for the best-prepared candidates. The enlargement negotiations
made substantial progress in the last eighteen months. The
objectives of the Commission's "roadmap" have been met, inas-
much as the discussion on the individual chapters of the negotia-
tions has begun on schedule, and been closed on the vast major-
ity of the outstanding issues. The intention to conclude negotia-
tions with most countries by the end of this year was reaffirmed
at the Seville European Council in June 2002."3
In this Essay, I outline how the negotiations that began in
1998 have brought us to this point. They have been a test for all
concerned, but I would argue, a test that demonstrates clearly
the ability of the EU to act in an area of decisive interest.
The procedure for the negotiations aims at ensuring an ef-
fective negotiation, in which the Member States and Candidate
Countries can take decisions that not only reflect the desire of
10. Id.
11. For all the Regular Reports 1998 - 2000, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/en-
largement/report2002/.
12. See Laeken European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 7
(2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/.
13. See Seville European Council, Presidency conclusions, Sec. II, para. 18 et.seq.
(2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/ [hereinafter Seville Pres-
idency conclusions].
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the candidates to join the Union, but that are also realizable,
and visibly so.
The roles of all concerned are clearly defined.' 4 Each Can-
didate Country draws up its position on each of the thirty-one
chapters of the EU acquis, to engage in negotiations. 5 Each has
a chief negotiator, usually at the level of deputy foreign minister,
supported by a team of experts from the important line minis-
tries who have to help define their country's position on each of
the chapters. On the side of the Union, the fifteen Member
States are the parties to the accession negotiations. The Presi-
dency of the Council of Ministers, which rotates among the
Member States every six months, presents the negotiating posi-
tions agreed on by the Council and chairs negotiating sessions at
the level of ministers or their deputies.' 6
The Commission proposes the draft negotiating positions to
the Member States, first at the level of the relevant working
group, which meets regularly, usually twice weekly, and then at
the level of deputies, and up to the ministerial level, and at the
European Council. The Commission maintains close contact
with the Candidate Countries in order to seek solutions to
problems arising during the negotiations. Within the Commis-
sion, the work is coordinated by the Directorate General for En-
largement. The General Secretariat of the Council provides the
secretariat for the negotiations."
The European Parliament, which must give its assent to the
resulting accession treaty, is kept informed of the progress of the
negotiations throughout."8 In addition, and since each Member
14. See Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2 1997, OJ. C
340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending Treaty on European
Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty es-
tablishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renum-
bering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
15. See European Commission, Negotiations, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/en-
largement/negotiations/index.htm.
16. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra n.14.
17. Id. art. 2 (39), O.J. C 340/1, at 43 (1997) (replacing art. 151 of Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community ("EC Treaty")).
18. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992 art. 158 O.J. C 224/
1, at 59 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 683 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating
changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU amended the Treaty establishing the Euro-
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State will need to ratify the treaty of accession, usually through
an act of Parliament, the Member States' governments inform
their Parliaments in accordance with their own domestic proce-
dures. In the Candidate Countries, the process of ratification is
likely to involve a popular referendum.
While the word "negotiations" may bring to mind to those
familiar with the United States the Strategic Arms Limitations
talks ("SALT") or other such international negotiations, the ac-
cession negotiations are a unique process. On joining the
Union, applicants are expected to accept the entire acquis com-
munautaire, i.e. the detailed laws and rules adopted on the basis
of the EU's founding treaties, mainly the Treaties of Rome,' 9
Maastricht,20 and Amsterdam. 2' The negotiations themselves fo-
cus on the terms under which the candidates will adopt, imple-
ment, and enforce the acquis and, notably, the granting of possi-
ble transitional arrangements, which must be limited in scope
and duration. Under similar arrangements, in previous acces-
sion negotiations, new Member States have been able to phase in
their compliance with certain laws and rules by a date agreed
upon during the negotiations.
After the Council in Luxembourg in December 1997 ap-
proved the Commission's Agenda 2000 proposal to open acces-
sion negotiations with some candidates,22 the negotiations began
on March 31, 1998 with six Candidate Countries, namely Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.23
On October 13, 1999, the Commission recommended Member
States to open negotiations with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Romania, and Slovakia.24
The first step of the negotiations was a process known as
pean Economic Community, Mar. 25 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty],
as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987) 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter
SEA]. The EC Treaty was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra n.14. These
amendments were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty
were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, O.J. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79, incorporating changes made by Treaty of
Amsterdam, supra n.14 [hereinafter Consolidated TEU].
19. EEC Treaty, supra n.18.
20. TEU, supra n.18.
21. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra n.14.
22. See Luxembourg European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.U. BULL., no.
12, at 8 (1997), available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/.
23. See Agenda 2000, E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 83 (1998).
24. See Agenda 2000, E.U. BULL., no. 10, at 55-57 (1999).
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"screening", whereby the Commission and the Candidate Coun-
try examined the compatibility of the candidate's legislation with
regard to existing EU law. The screening process is designed to
identify issues with regard to legal compatibility or with regard to
institutional ability to actually implement the law that should be
addressed in the negotiations.
Conscious of the need to ensure that the negotiations fol-
lowed a predictable and transparent path, the Commission pro-
posed in 2000 to the European Council at Nice a so-called "road
map" .5 This laid down a calendar for beginning discussion on
each chapter of the acquis with each country. The road map was
also the answer to those who considered this unprecedented en-
largement to be an administrative task of such complexity, that it
was bound to lead to delays and allow prevarication by any reluc-
tant players.
The road map foresaw the opening of negotiations with less
complex chapters of the acquis such as the small- and medium-
sized enterprises ("SME") policy, or the cultural and audio-visual
policy, which do not involve a large body of EU law (cultural
policy is largely a matter of Member States' competence), or do
not involve politically difficult choices. This allowed the Candi-
date Countries' negotiating teams to become integrated into the
process over time, and develop the kind of administrative mech-
anisms that are required in their home countries, where they
frequently consult or inform parliamentary committees, meet
with the social partners, and so on.
The road map presented by the Commission and endorsed
by the Nice European Council has turned out to work extremely
well. It has proved possible to solve difficult issues in most cases
in accordance with the timetable. The latest example is the
Spanish Presidency, where substantial progress has been made
on all outstanding issues. 2 6 More than eighty percent of the ne-
gotiating chapters have been provisionally closed by the end of
June.2 7
While the EU has always rejected the idea of offering an
accession date to any individual candidate, since accession can
25. See Nice European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 103
(2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/.
26. See Seville Presidency conclusions, supra n.13.
27. See id.
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only take place at a time and according to a schedule appropri-
ate to each candidate, the progress of the negotiations neverthe-
less allowed us to see, at a certain point, that there would be the
light at the end of the tunnel. Therefore, at the European
Council in G6teborg in June 2001, it was agreed that the end of
2002 could see the conclusion of the negotiations with those
Candidate Countries that were ready.28 As the negotiations pro-
ceeded on schedule, this schedule has been maintained, and the
Seville European Council in June 2002 stated:
If the present rate of progress in negotiations and reforms is
maintained, the European Union is determined to conclude
the negotiations with Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, the
Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Repub-
lic and Slovenia by the end of 2002, if those countries are
ready [in order that] these countries should participate in the
elections for the European Parliament in 2004 as full mem-
bers.2 9
In the coming months the negotiations will, to a large ex-
tent, focus on the financial package relating to the enlargement.
It concerns issues such as how the new Member States shall be
integrated into the Common Agricultural Policy; the extent of
the regional aid; and how to ensure that the Candidate Coun-
tries will not be worse off in budgetary terms by joining the EU.
These are issues sensitive to present Member States and to the
Candidate Countries.
The Commission has presented proposals for EU positions
on all these aspects and they are presently being negotiated with
the Member States. In our proposals we have kept to three prin-
ciples.
First, that the global budgetary ceilings agreed upon by the
Member States at the European Council in Berlin in 199930 must
be respected. Alongside the funds set aside for the EU budget
itself, these budgetary ceilings foresee a specific amount of
money available both for the Candidate Countries and for these
same countries after they become members.
Second, that the new Member States shall take part in all
28. See G6teborg European Council, Presidency conclusions (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/.
29. See Seville Presidency conclusions, supra n.13, at 6.
30. See Berlin European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 7
(1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/.
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common policies, even though in some areas there will be a
need for a phasing-in period.
Third, that negotiations shall be without prejudice to future
reforms of agriculture and regional policies. The enlargement
negotiations and the reform debate are two separate issues.
In the regular reports published on October 9, 2002, the
Commission recommended that ten Candidate Countries are
ready for accession and consequently, are ready to conclude the
negotiations by the end of this year.3 On this basis, the Euro-
pean Council in Brussels in the end of October 2 launched the
final phase of the negotiations.
The European Council in Copenhagen in December would
then be the occasion to conclude the negotiations. It would also
be the occasion to set out a road map for the further negotia-
tions with those Candidate Countries that will not form part of
the first accession.
The European vocation of Turkey was confirmed at the Eu-
ropean Council in Helsinki." In its 2002 Regular Report on the
progress of Turkey towards the EU,34 the Commission welcomed
the progress made, both, in terms of economic reform, where
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") support has been vital
during a difficult period, and in political terms. Here, the EU
has said clearly what it hopes to see achievement before it can
consider moving to a next step in Turkey's application for mem-
bership. The elections in Turkey will be a key indicator for these
decisions.
I have described the process of negotiations itself. However,
this process of negotiation in Brussels reflects an enormous
amount of preparation carried out in the Candidate Countries.
These preparations involve political reform, economic reform,
and also, most importantly as far as the negotiations themselves
are concerned, legal and administrative reform.
New members join a community of law. They need to meet
their obligations for membership in full. That is why the adop-
31. See European Commission, Towards the Enlarged Union, at htpp://europa.eu.
int/comm/enlargement/report2002/.
32. See Brussels European Council, at htpp://europa.eu.int/comm/brussels_
council_20021024/indexen.html.
33. See Helsinki European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at
8 (1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/.
34. See Towards the Enlarged Union, supra n.3 1.
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tion of legislation for aligning with the acquis is so important.
But equally important is the progress in setting up and strength-
ening the institutions required for implementing and enforcing
the legislation. A modern, well-functioning public administra-
tion and the necessary institutions are indispensable for any
member of the EU. Just as important is a well-trained judiciary
versed in Community law and able to apply and interpret it effec-
tively.
The Union has developed a detailed and sophisticated sys-
tem of instruments to help Candidate Countries in their prepa-
rations for membership. At the same time, these instruments
serve as a safeguard for the Union that new members can meet
their obligations as members. Among the various instruments,
one could highlight the following:
* The Commission keeps track of the implementation of
commitments made by candidates in the negotiations and
compiles for the Member States a monitoring report for
each country. These reports set out commitments ful-
filled, and those issues requiring close attention in terms
of implementation of the acquis."5
* Action Plans for Administrative Capacity are agreed with
each of the Candidate Countries. They identify for each,
the next steps that are required to achieve an adequate
level of administrative and judicial capacity by the time of
accession. They also identify in which areas Candidate
Countries need target assistance to complete their prepa-
rations.
* Under a system of peer reviews, experts from Member
States and the Commission in charge of implementing
and enforcing the acquis in a certain policy area evaluate
the level of preparation of, and formulate advice for their
counterparts, in the negotiating countries. Ongoing re-
views cover areas such as food-safety, justice and home af-
fairs, financial services, and nuclear safety.
An impressive amount of political capital has been invested
in the reform process under way in the Candidate Countries. It
must be recognized that this reform has exposed the societies of
35. See Commission of the European Communities, Towards the Enlarged Union:
Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by each
of the candidate countries, COM (2002) 700 Final, 24 (Oct. 2002), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/report2002/strategy-en.pdf.
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the Candidate Countries to enormous pressure. They have had
to make the transition from Communist rule and centrally
planned economies to democracy and market economy. At the
same time, they have had to adapt to the highly developed sys-
tem of European integration.
It is therefore understandable that the people need to see
where they are going, and what is waiting for them when they
arrive. In addition, the citizens of the Member States see that
enlargement is approaching and they expect to be informed.
The benefits of enlargement are clear on the macro-level, in
terms of a larger single market for EU business and consumers,
the consolidation of democracy for a large region of our conti-
nent, and so on. But there are also a number of other concerns
that have been raised on the consequences of enlargement both,
in the Member States and in the Candidate Countries. Cheap
labor influxes will "destroy" the employment in the EU, accord-
ing to some. Real estate prices will soar in the Candidate Coun-
tries, according to others. Still others fear that the enlargement
may lead to opportunities for international crime and increases
in corruption and fraud.
The Commission takes these concerns seriously. In fact
many of them are reflected closely in specific issues in the nego-
tiations. In our effort to explain to our citizens that EU enlarge-
ment is not the problem, but that it is part of the solution, we
draw on a number of premises.
First, experience from previous accession negotiation shows
that most of the fears are exaggerated. For instance, in Sweden
there was a widespread fear of the consequences on enlarge-
ment on the market of secondary residence. In retrospect, it is
clear that the fears were exaggerated. Similarly, there were wide-
spread fears over the consequences on the labor market of the
Spanish and Portuguese accession. But there was no invasion of
cheap labor and the transitional arrangement agreed was there-
fore also shortened.
Second, the negotiations have shown that when concerns
are well founded, reasonable solutions can be found. We have,
for instance, found a compromise concerning the free move-
ment of labor and we have found compromises on the acquisi-
tion of land in the Candidate Countries.
Third, many of the underlying threats fuelling the fears and
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concerns are here irrespective of enlargement. We have, for in-
stance, to face the threat of a sophisticated and ruthless interna-
tional criminality already today, be it in trafficking of human be-
ings, or in drugs. The enlargement process can and should con-
tribute to making us better equipped to meet such threats. The
enhanced co-operation will strengthen the necessary law en-
forcement institutions in the Candidate Countries. The acces-
sion negotiations will accelerate the ongoing reform process of
the judiciary. And with the prospect of membership, the Candi-
date Countries will be part of the future common measures in
this field.
Fourth, public opinion36 faced with the challenges of en-
largement is, of course, subject to a feeling of uncertainty.
Surveys in the Member States and the Candidate Countries give
a varying picture. Undoubtedly, there is a need for information
and discussion on the consequences of enlargement both in the
Candidate Countries and in the Member States. It is clear to me
that it is a challenge, which must be met on local and national
levels. It is a responsibility not only for politicians, but also for
decision-makers in industry and in other sectors of society.
Enlargement is a vast, complex, and difficult task. It must
not be underestimated. Although we have come a long way,
there are major challenges in front of us. The window of oppor-
tunity for enlarging the Union is now open. Our objective is to
bring together the circle "from Copenhagen to Copenhagen."
36. See European Commission, Public Opinion, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/en-
largement/opinion/index.htm.
